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Abstract
This paper examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that
nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and
educational choices. Wage growth occurs in the model because workers move
between rms and occupations as they search for suitable job matches and
because workers endogenously accumulate rm and occupation specic human
capital. Simulations performed using the estimated model reveal that both
self-selection in occupational choices and mobility between rms account for a
much larger share of total earnings and utility than the combined e¤ects of rm
and occupation specic human capital. Eliminating the gains from matching
between workers and occupations would reduce total wages by 31%, eliminating
the gains from job search would reduce wages by 19%, and eliminating the
e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital on wages would reduce
wages by only 2.8%.
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1 Introduction
Over the course of their careers people choose how much education to obtain, which occupations to
work in, and when to move between rms. These decisions are inherently interrelated, yet existing
research has generally examined educational attainment, occupational choices, and on-the-job human
capital accumulation separately from decisions about job search.1 As a result of this separation in the
literature, there is currently no way to assess the importance of interactions between these decisions,
or to determine the importance of human capital relative to the importance of mobility between rms
and occupations in determining wage growth over the career.
The goal of this paper is to address this gap in the literature by estimating a dynamic structural
model of career choices that incorporates the key features of a job search model within a dynamic
human capital model of occupational and educational choices. The model allows workers to accumulate
rm and occupation specic human capital as they move between rms and occupations over their
careers. Estimating the model provides evidence about the relative importance of human capital, job
search, and matching between workers and occupations in determining wages and total utility. The
parameter estimates reveal that each aspect of the model is quantitatively important and necessary
to understand the evolution of wages over the career. However, the main empirical conclusion that
emerges from this analysis is that self selection in occupational choices and mobility between rms are
much more important determinants of total earnings and utility than the combined e¤ects of rm and
occupation specic human capital.
In the career choice model developed in this paper, forward looking workers choose when to attend
school and when to move between occupations and rms as they maximize their discounted expected
utility. Search frictions such as randomness in job o¤ers and moving costs impose constraints on the
mobility of workers between occupations and rms. Over the course of their careers workers endoge-
nously accumulate general human capital in the form of education as well as occupation and rm
1See Keane and Wolpin (1997), Lee (2005), and Lee and Wolpin (2006) for examples of dynamic human capital
models that focus on occupational choices and human capital accumulation. A recent survey of the extensive job search
literature is provided by Eckstein and van den Berg (2006).
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specic human capital.2 The value of employment varies over the ve occupations in the economy
because workers have heterogeneous skill endowments and preferences for employment across occu-
pations, and because the e¤ect of human capital on wages varies across occupations. Workers search
for suitable wage and non-pecuniary match values at rms across occupations given their innate skills
and preferences and stock of human capital.3
The parameters of the structural model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using
data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The estimated
structural wage equation reveals that expected wage o¤ers tend to increase as workers accumulate
rm and occupation specic human capital. Wage o¤ers are also impacted by the quality of the
match between a worker and his employer, and by the quality of the match between a worker and
his occupation. The estimated structural model is used to perform counterfactual simulations which
reveal that eliminating the gains from matching between workers and occupations would reduce total
wages by 31%, eliminating the gains from job search would reduce wages by 19%, and eliminating
the combined e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital on wages would reduce earnings
by only 2.8%. Existing research has been unable to determine the importance of each of these e¤ects
because the typical approaches to studying wage growth over the career examine the contributions of
either human capital accumulation or mobility in isolation, but do not attempt to jointly estimate the
importance of each facet of the career decision problem.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that demonstrates the value of using dynamic discrete
choice models to study employment and educational choices over the career. Empirical studies of
occupational and educational choices are frequently based on the framework of human capital models,
which have taken the form of dynamic programming models in recent work (Keane and Wolpin 1997,
2Throughout this paper the term human capital is used to refer to wage growth that occurs with tenure in both rms
and occupations, since actual human capital is of course unobserved. This paper does not attempt to address the di¢ cult
issue of separately identifying human capital e¤ects from other sources of within-job wage growth, such as promotions
that may be unrelated to productivity growth, or wage growth due to contracts designed to provide incentives to workers.
3Allowing for search based on non-pecuniary utility generalizes the approach used in many search models which
assume that workers search only for wage match values. See Blau (1991), Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998), and Dey
and Flinn (2005) for examples of search models that incorporate non-pecuniary job characteristics.
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Lee 2005, Lee and Wolpin 2006).4 In these dynamic human capital models workers endogenously
accumulate education and occupation specic human capital as they make optimal career choices, but
all jobs are identical within an occupation. In contrast to dynamic human capital models, an extensive
job search literature has emphasized the importance of job matching between workers and rms in
determining wages while generally abstracting away from both occupational choices and human capital
accumulation.5
The model developed in this paper expands on the occupational choice model of Keane and Wolpin
(1997) by incorporating job matching between workers and rms, rm specic human capital, hetero-
geneity in preferences for employment in each occupation, and by expanding the number of civilian
occupations from two to ve. Incorporating the human capital occupational choice approach to ca-
reer dynamics along with the rm based job search approach within a unied model is necessary to
determine the relative importance of each aspect of the career decision problem in explaining career
choices, wages, and total utility.
2 Data
The parameters of the model are estimated using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY). This data set includes detailed information about the educational and employment
experiences of a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women who were 14-22 years
old when rst interviewed in 1979. The data provide a rich set of educational information about
each respondent, including dates of school attendance and dates of graduation and GED receipt.
Employment data include the duration of every employment spell over the sample period, along with
the corresponding wages, hours, and occupation for each employment spell.
The NLSY consists of a nationally representative core sample, a military sample, and a supplemen-
4See Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Belzil and Hansen (2002) for examples of papers that estimate dynamic structural
models that abstract away from occupational choices and focus on the endogenous accumulation of education.
5Berkovec and Stern (1991) and Wolpin (1992) develop search models that include rm specic capital but these
models do not incorporate occupational choices. McCall (1990) and Neal (1999) develop search models that incorporate
occupations, but these models do not include human capital accumulation.
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Table 1 
Description of Aggregated Occupations 
Aggregated Occupations 
1970 Census 
Occupation 
Codes 
Example Occupations 
Professional, Technical, 
Managers 
001 - 245 Architects, Economists, Office Managers 
Craftsmen 401 - 580 Carpenters, Electricians, Automobile Mechanics 
Operatives & Non-farm Laborers 601 - 785 Butchers, Truck Drivers, Groundskeepers 
Sales & Clerical 260 - 395 Insurance Agents, Bank Tellers 
Service 901 - 984 Janitors, Dishwashers, Nursing Aides 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Choice Distribution by Age 
Age School 
Professional 
& Managers Craftsmen 
Operatives 
& laborers 
Sales & 
clerical Service Unemployed 
Total 
Observations 
16 85.7 1.4 2.2 10.9 2.9 7.6 10.4 1,023 
17 79.4 2.1 4.0 12.7 7.1 8.5 12.6 963 
18 48.3 2.8 6.8 16.9 8.0 8.5 21.4 893 
19 38.2 5.6 10.1 17.7 8.8 7.4 20.4 838 
20 33.3 8.9 14.3 17.4 7.8 7.4 19.7 798 
21 27.6 11.5 16.8 17.6 9.5 6.9 18.0 756 
22 16.4 17.5 17.5 18.6 13.9 6.2 16.4 714   
23 10.5 22.7 16.6 18.4 14.4 8.4 14.8 675 
24 8.3 26.1 20.1 18.6 12.9 7.6 10.5 641 
25 4.8 29.2 21.4 16.3 12.7 6.8 12.0 607 
26 5.8 32.6 19.7 18.3 11.7 7.1 8.7 589 
27 3.4 32.2 21.0 16.9 13.5 5.0 10.5 562 
28 5.0 35.8 19.4 15.5 11.2 5.4 10.6 536 
29 1.2 33.7 16.7 18.2 10.5 7.2 13.4 516 
30 1.0 34.5 19.5 17.9 11.4 6.6 9.4 498 
All   24.6       19.8 15.1 16.8 10.4 7.1 13.9 10,609 
Note:  Entries are percentages. Rows need not sum to 100% because school attendance and employment are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tal sample that over-samples blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites. This analysis
uses only white men from the nationally representative core sample, and these individuals are followed
from age 16 until age 30. The nal sample consists of 1,023 men who remain in the sample for an
average of 10.37 years, resulting in 10,609 person yearsof data. The decision period in the model
corresponds to a school year, which runs from September to August.6 The data are aggregated using
an approach similar to that of Keane and Wolpin (1997) to assign yearly employment status and school
attendance. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the procedures used to aggregate the data.
The NLSY data provides information on occupational codes at the three digit level. However, the
cost of estimating the model increases substantially as the number of occupations increases, so using
extremely detailed occupational classications is not feasible. Occupations are aggregated into the
ve occupational groups listed in Table 1. Aggregating occupations into ve groups is a lower level of
aggregation than that found in comparable existing research.7
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section highlights the key characteristics of the data and provides descriptive statistics about the
career choices observed in the data. Table 2 shows the choice distribution by age. Approximately
86% of the sample attends school at age 16. School attendance takes a discrete drop to 48% at age
18, the age where most people have graduated from high school. As an alternative to high school
graduation, 6.6% of the sample reports earning a GED at some point over the sample period. School
attendance declines steadily throughout the college ages and then drops to approximately 16% at age
22, the normal college graduation age.
The percentage of people unemployed is 10% at age 16. Unemployment rises to approximately
20% at ages 18-21 before stabilizing at close to 10% at ages 24 and above. The large number of
people classied as unemployed is due to the denition of school attendance used to classify people
6Yearly data are frequently used when estimating dynamic structural models. See, for example, Keane and Wolpin
(1997) or Belzil and Hansen (2002).
7Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005) aggregate the data into only two occupations (blue and white collar). Lee
and Wolpin (2006) allow workers to choose between blue, white, and pink collar employment in both the service and
goods sectors.
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Table 3 
Summary of Occupational Mobility by Age: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data 
(bottom entry) 
Ages Conditional on Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
Conditional on not Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
16-21 57.64% 
                  54.40% 
29.94% 
27.38% 
22-25 50.09% 
47.14% 
26.85% 
23.39% 
26-30 40.76% 
37.86% 
17.61% 
14.83% 
All Ages 49.78% 
46.56% 
24.69% 
21.75% 
Note: Probabilities are computed using all consecutive years of employment observed in the data for each 
age group. The top entry of each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom entry is computed 
using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
Table 4 
Occupational Transition Matrix: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data (bottom 
entry) 
 Professional & 
Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Professional & 
Managers 
83.28 
86.10 
4.22 
2.84 
3.00 
2.48 
7.35 
6.61 
2.15 
1.97 
Craftsmen 7.25 
5.40 
75.59 
77.54 
13.05 
12.15 
2.55 
4.36 
1.57 
.55 
Operatives & 
Laborers 
4.74 
4.73 
14.90 
13.53 
68.98 
71.24 
7.66 
7.52 
3.71 
2.98 
Sales & Clerical 20.45 
17.31 
4.60 
6.01 
10.76 
8.87 
61.94 
 65.36 
2.25 
2.45 
Service 10.53 
8.82 
7.22 
7.01 
9.32 
8.05 
4.51 
6.23 
68.42 
69.89 
Note: The entries in this table are transition probabilities from the occupation in the left column to the occupation 
in the top row. The top entry of each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom entry is computed 
using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as attending school. A person must attend school and complete a grade to be coded as attending
school, so people who attend school and fail to complete a grade are classied as unemployed. Keane
and Wolpin (1997) report a similarly high rate of unemployment using slightly di¤erent denitions of
employment and school attendance.
Table 3 shows that there are di¤erences in the levels of inter-rm and intra-rm occupational
mobility. The relevant entries in each cell for this discussion are the top entries, which are computed
using the NLSY data.8 Mobility between occupations is more likely to occur when a person switches
rms than when the person does not switch rms. The age patterns in these two types of occupational
mobility are also quite di¤erent. Inter-rm occupational mobility declines by 29% from the youngest
age group to the oldest, while intra-rm occupational mobility declines by 41%.
Table 4 allows for a more detailed examination of mobility between occupations. Cell (i,j ) of this
table (where i represents the row and j represents the column) gives the percentage of employment
spells in occupation i that are followed by a spell in occupation j. For example, cell (2,1) indicates
that a person employed as a craftsman has a 7.25% chance of becoming a professional or managerial
worker in the next year, conditional on being employed in the next year. The diagonal elements
of the occupational transition matrix in Table 4 are fairly large, indicating a substantial amount of
persistence in occupational choices. However, even at this relatively high level of aggregation there
is a substantial amount of occupational mobility. The diagonal elements show that people employed
as professional and managerial workers are least likely to switch occupations, while sales and clerical
workers are most likely to switch occupations.
3 Economic Model of Career Choices
Each individuals career is modeled as a nite horizon, discrete time dynamic programming problem.
Workers search for suitable wage and non-wage match values across rms while employed and non-
employed given their skills and preferences for employment in each occupation. Each period, an
8The bottom entries in the cells in Tables 3 and 4 are computed using simulated data generated from the estimated
structural model. These entries will be discussed in detail later in the paper.
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individual always receives one job o¤er from a rm in each occupation and has the option of attending
school, earning a GED, or becoming unemployed. In addition, people who are employed have the
option of staying at their current job during the next year and may also have the option of switching
occupations within their current rm.
3.1 Utility Function
The utility function is a choice specic function of endogenous state variables (St), skill endowments
and preferences, and random utility shocks that vary over time, people, occupations, and rm matches.
The variables in St measure educational attainment, rm and occupation specic human capital, and
the quality of the match between a worker and rm. To index choices for the non-work alternatives,
let s = school, g = GED and u = unemployed.9 Describing working alternatives requires two indexes.
Let eq = employed in occupation q, where q = 1; :::; 5 indexes occupations. Also, let nf =working
at a new rm, and of =working at an old rm.Combinations of these indexes dene all the feasible
choices available to an individual. The description of the utility ows is simplied by dening another
index that indicates whether or not a person is employed, so let emp =employed. Dene the binary
variable dt(k) = 1 if choice combination k is chosen at time t, where k is a vector that contains a
feasible combination of the choice indexes. For example, dt(s) = 1 indicates that schooling is chosen
at time t, and dt(s; e3; nf) = 1 indicates attending school (s) while employed in the third occupation
(e3) at a new rm (nf). Dual activities composed of combinations of any two activities are allowed
subject to the logical restrictions outlined in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Choice Specic Utility Flows
This section outlines the utility ows corresponding to each possible choice. The utility ow from
choice combination k is the sum of the logarithm of the wage, wit(k), and non-pecuniary utility,
Hit(k), that person i receives from choice combination k at time t,
Uit(k) = wit(k) +Hit(k): (1)
9There is no uncertainty in the receipt of a GED in the model. If an individual decides to earn a GED, he receives
one. In reality, people must pass a test to earn a GED. Tyler et al (2000) report that roughly 70% of people pass the
GED exam on the rst try. Within two years the eventual pass rate is 85%.
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The remainder of this section describes the structure of the wage and non-pecuniary utility ows in
more detail.
3.1.1a Wages. The log-wage of worker i employed at rm j in occupation q at time t is
wit = wq(Sit) + 
q
i +  ij + eijt: (2)
The term wq(Sit) represents the portion of the log wage that is a deterministic function of the work
experience and education variables in the state vector. The term qi represents the random component
of worker is wages that is common across all rms in occupation q. This term allows people to have
comparative advantages in their occupation specic skill endowments. The permanent worker-rm
productivity match is represented by  ij . True randomness in wages is captured by eijt. All of the
components of the wage (wit) are observed by the worker when a job o¤er is received.
3.1.1b Non-pecuniary Utility Flows. Non-pecuniary utility ows are composed of a deterministic
function of the state vector, rm specic match values, person specic preference heterogeneity, and
random utility shocks. Dene 1fg as the indicator function which is equal to one if its argument is
true and equal to zero otherwise. The non-pecuniary utility ow equation is
Hit(k) = [h(k; Sit)] +
h
si1fs 2 kg+ ui 1fu 2 kg+
P5
q=1 
q
i 1feq 2 kg
i
(3)
+"ikt:
The rst term in brackets represents the inuence of the state vector on non-pecuniary utility ows
and is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph. The second term in brackets captures the
e¤ect of person specic heterogeneity in preferences for attending school (si ), being unemployed (
u
i ),
and being employed in occupation q (qi ). The non-pecuniary occupation match value, 
q
i , represents
the random component of person is preference for working in occupation q. This term captures
variation in the value that people place on job attributes such as the physical or mental demands of
a job or the risk of injury that is common across jobs in each occupation. Stinebrickner (2001) shows
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that preference heterogeneity is an important determinant of occupational choices at the narrow level
of choosing between a teaching or non-teaching job. However, this type of heterogeneity in preferences
has not been extended to broader models of occupational choice. The nal term, "ikt, is a shock to
the non-pecuniary utility that person i receives from choice combination k at time t.
The remaining portion of the non-pecuniary utility function contains the non-pecuniary employ-
ment and non-employment utility ows along with the schooling cost function. This utility ow
equation is specied as
h(k; Sit) =
hP5
q=1 q(Sit)1feq 2 kg+ ij1femp 2 kg
i
(4)
+Cs(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp =2 kg+ Csw(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp 2 kg
+b(Sit)1fu 2 kg+ Cg(Sit)1fg 2 kg:
The term in brackets contains the occupation and rm specic non-pecuniary utility ows. The
occupation specic portion of this ow, q(Sit), is a function of the state vector that is allowed to vary
over occupations. The rm specic non-pecuniary match value for person i at rm j is represented
by ij . This match value reects the inuence of permanent attributes of employment at each rm
that a¤ect the employment utility ow and are not observed by the econometrician. The second line
of equation 4 contains the schooling cost function for attending school while not employed (Cs(Sit))
and employed (Csw(Sit)). The nal components of the non-pecuniary utility ow are the deterministic
portions of the value of leisure enjoyed while unemployed, b(Sit), and the cost function for earning a
GED, Cg(Sit).
3.1.2 Constraints on the Choice Set
The structural modeling approach requires a detailed specication of the labor market constraints that
determine an individuals choice set in each year. First, consider the case of an individual who enters
time period t having not been employed in the previous year. At the start of the year the individual
receives ve job o¤ers, one from a rm in each of the ve occupations in the economy.10 Any dual
10 In this model workers always have the option of returning to their current job, although the o¤ered wage will change
because each job receives a new random shock in each year (eijt). This framework is adopted in many papers such as
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activity is a feasible choice, subject to the following restrictions. Earning a GED must be part of a
joint activity, so the single activity dt(g) = 1 is not a feasible choice. In addition, earning a GED is
dropped from the choice set after high school graduation or GED receipt. Finally, unemployment and
employment are mutually exclusive choices. Given these restrictions, the choice set for individuals
who are not employed when they enter period t is
Dnet = f[dt(s); dt(u); dt(u; g)]; [dt(ei; nf); i = 1; :::; 5]; (5)
[dt(q; ei; nf); q = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5]g:
Next, consider the feasible choices for a person employed in occupation q: At the start of period
t the individual receives one new job o¤er from a rm in each of the ve occupations and has the
option to attend school, earn a GED, or become unemployed. In addition, an employed individual
always has the option of remaining at his current rm and staying in his current occupation (q). Job
o¤ers from new occupations at the current rm are received randomly, where workers receive either
zero or one such o¤er per year. Let j denote the probability that a worker receives an o¤er to work
in occupation j at his current rm, where j 6= q. Let nq be the probability that a worker employed
in occupation q does not receive an o¤er to switch occupations within his current rm.
The choice set for a worker employed in occupation q who receives an o¤er to switch to occupation
j at his current rm is
Det (j) = fDnet ; [dt(eq; of); dt(s; eq; of); dt(g; eq; of)]; [dt(ej; of); dt(s; ej; of); dt(g; ej; of)]g: (6)
If an o¤er to switch occupations within the current rm is not received, then the nal three choices
are not available to the agent. Let Det (0) denote this twenty-one element choice set.
3.1.3 State Variables
The endogenous state variables in the vector St measure human capital and the quality of the match
between the worker and his current employer. Let at represent an individuals age. Educational
Berkovec and Stern (1991), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Lee and Wolpin (2005). An alternative framework allows for
a job destruction (layo¤) probability and allows workers to always stay at the existing job at the previous wage. Given
the available data these two models are observationally equivalent, see Eckstein and van den Berg (2006) for a detailed
discussion.
9
attainment is summarized by the number of years of high school and college completed, ht and ct, and
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a GED has been earned, gt: Work experience is captured
by the amount of rm specic human capital (ft) and occupation specic human capital (ot) in the
occupation that the person worked in most recently. Let Ot 2 [1; 2; :::; 5] indicate the occupation in
which a person was most recently employed. Let Lt be a variable that indicates a persons previous
choice, where Lt = f1; :::; 5g refers to working in occupations one through ve, Lt = 6 indicates
attending school full time, and Lt = 7 indicates unemployment.
Given this notation, the state vector is St = fat; ht; ct; gt; ft; ot;Ot; Lt; t;  tg: Including both rm
and occupation specic human capital as state variables causes problems because the size of the
state space quickly becomes intractably large due to the fact that the model incorporates job search,
occupational choices, and educational choices. In order to keep the model tractable, only human
capital in the most recent occupation is included in the state space even though this requires a strong
assumption about the transferability of human capital across occupations and the depreciation of
human capital. However, age e¤ects are included in the wage equations to proxy for general human
capital that has value in more than one occupation.
In addition to assuming that only human capital in the most recent occupation a¤ects wages, a
second approach is taken to further reduce the size of the state space. Assume that rm and occupation
specic human capital each take on P values, so that the possible values of human capital arranged
in ascending order are
ft 2 FC = ff(1);:::; f(P )g
ot 2 OC = fo(1);:::; o(P )g:
After each year of work experience, with probability  human capital increases to the next level,
and with probability (1   ) human capital does not increase.11 There are separate skill increase
probabilities for rm and occupation specic capital, and the rates of skill increase are also allowed to
vary across occupations. The skill increase parameters are fkf ; ko ; k = 1; :::; 5g, where the subscripts
11Brown and Flinn (2004) use a similar method to model the process by which child quality changes over time.
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f and o refer to rm and occupation specic capital, and k indexes occupations. The human capital
transition probabilities are known by agents in the model. The size of the state space is signicantly
reduced when P is a small number relative to the possible values of years of work experience, but
the model still captures the human capital improvement process. In this work, P = 3. Sections 5.1
and 5.2 present evidence that the discrete approach to modelling human capital provides parameter
estimates that t the observed patterns in wage growth in the NLSY extremely well.
This method of modelling human capital has the advantage of making it possible to include both
rm and occupation specic human capital in the state space at a fraction of the cost of keeping
track of actual years of experience at a rm or in an occupation, because work experience could range
from zero to fteen years in this model. Viewing increases in human capital as a stochastic event
is consistent with the idea that years of work experience only serve as a proxy for an individuals
unobservable true level of human capital.
3.2 The Optimization Problem
Individuals maximize the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility from age 16 (t = 1) to
a known terminal age, t = T . At the start of his career, the individual knows the deterministic
components of the utility function and his endowment of market skills and occupation specic non-
pecuniary match values. The maximization problem can be represented in terms of alternative specic
value functions.12 The value function for an individual with discount factor  employed in occupation
q is
Vt(eq; l) = Ut(eq; l) + 
X
k 6=q
kEZ
ek
t + [nqEZ
eq
t ]; q = 1; :::; 5; l = of; nf: (7)
The EZekt terms represent the expected value of the best choice in period t+1, conditional on receipt
of an o¤er to work in occupation k at the workers current rm. The expectations are taken over the
random components of the choice specic utility ows, which are the random utility shocks and match
values, f"; e;  ; g. The expectation is also taken over rm and occupation specic human capital,
since human capital evolves stochastically. Consider the rst summation in equation 7. Each term in
12The value function is a function of St, but this argument is suppressed for brevity of notation.
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the sum corresponds to the probability that a job o¤er to work in a new occupation at the current
rm is received (so k 6= q), multiplied by the corresponding expected value of the best option next
period.
The individual elements of the EZekt terms are the time t + 1 value functions for each feasible
choice,
EZekt = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); [Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);
m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5; ]; Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of);
Vt+1(ek; of); Vt+1(s; ek; of); Vt+1(g; ek; of)g : (8)
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these expected values as Emax. The nal term in
the employed value function corresponds to the case where an individual does not receive an o¤er
to switch occupations within his current rm. In this case, switching occupations without switching
rms is not possible, so the expected value of the best choice at time t+ 1 is
EZeqt = EmaxfVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (9)
[Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5];
Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of)g:
The value function for an individual who is not currently employed is simpler because mobility
within a rm is obviously not possible for people who are not employed. The value function is
Vt(p) = Ut(p) + EZ
su
t ; p = fsg; fug; fu; gg (10)
The corresponding expected value of the maximum term is
EZsut = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (11)
Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf); m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5g ;
which consists of all feasible combinations of schooling, unemployment, and new job o¤ers.13
13Pavan (2006) estimates a model of career choices that focuses on modeling mobility at the very disaggregated level of
three-digit occupations and industries. In contrast, the model developed in this paper uses much more highly aggregated
occupation groups, but allows for endogenous educational attainment and heterogeneous human capital e¤ects across
occupations.
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3.3 Solving the Career Decision Problem
Estimating the structural parameters of the model requires solving the optimization problem faced
by agents in the model. The nite horizon dynamic programming problem is solved using standard
backwards recursion techniques. Before considering the solution of the model in more detail, it is
useful to specify the distributions of the random components of utility ows.
3.3.1 Distributional Assumptions
Assume that rm specic match values and randomness in wages are distributed i.i.d normal: ij v
N(0; 2),  ij v N(0; 2 ), and eijt v N(0; 2e). The rm specic pecuniary and non-pecuniary
match values are part of the state space so a discrete approximation to these distributions is used
when solving the optimization problem. Assume that the random choice-specic utility shocks are
distributed extreme value, with distribution function F (") = expf  exp(  " )g, and with variance
22=6: The assumption that " is distributed extreme value simplies the computation of the value
functions and choice probabilities.
It remains to specify the distributions of the occupation specic skill endowments and preferences.
Using an approach similar to Heckman and Singer (1984) and Keane and Wolpin (1997), the joint
distribution of skill endowments and preferences is specied as a discrete multinomial distribution. Let
i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g be the vector of skill endowments and preferences that are known
to the agent at age sixteen.
Assume that there areM types of people, each with a di¤erent endowment of skills and preferences,
fm;m = 1; :::;Mg. Dene m(hi1) as the proportion of the mth type in the population, where the
argument hi1 indicates that the type probabilities are conditioned on the number of years of high
school that an individual has completed as of age 16 (individuals reach age 16 in time period t = 1
by denition).14 Endowment heterogeneity is unobserved to the econometrician, but assume that
we do know that there are M types of people. This exible assumption about the joint distribution
14Following Keane and Wolpin (1997) type probabilities are allowed to vary between individuals who have not completed
the 10th grade by age 16 and those who have complete at least the 10th grade by age 16.
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of skills and preferences allows for a wide range of patterns of comparative advantages in skills and
heterogeneity in preferences.
3.3.2 Calculating the Value Functions
The major complication arises from the fact that as the model is specied the Emax integrals do not
have closed form solutions. This paper uses an interpolation algorithm that builds on the one developed
by Keane and Wolpin (1994) to decrease the amount of time needed to solve the optimization problem.
The details of the simulation and interpolation solution method are presented in Appendix B.
4 Estimation of The Structural Model
The parameters of the model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML) using the career
history data from the NLSY. This section begins by specifying functional forms for the utility ow
equations.
4.1 Further Model Specication
Before discussing the details of estimating the parameters of the structural model, it remains to specify
the wage equations, non-pecuniary utility ow equations, and job o¤er probabilities in more detail.
4.1.1 Wage and Utility Flow Equations
This section denes the deterministic portion of the utility function. The deterministic portion of the
occupation specic human capital wage function is
wq(Sit) = 
q
1ait + 
q
2a
2
it=100 + 
q
3hit + 
q
4cit + 
q
51[ait  17]+ (12)
q61[ait  18 \ ait  21] + q7git
+q81[fit = f(1)] + 
q
91[fit = f(2)] + 
q
101[fit = f(3)]
+q111[oit = o(1)] + 
q
121[oit = o(2)] + 
q
131[oit = o(3)]:
The parameters q8 and 
q
11 are xed at zero since they are not separately identied from the constant
in the wage equation.
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Let NFt be a dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual is in his rst year of
employment at a rm after being employed at a di¤erent rm in the previous period. Let hdt and cdt
represent dummy variables that indicate receipt of a high school or college diploma. The non-pecuniary
utility ow equation for occupation q is
q(Sit) = 
q
1ait + 
q
2a
2
it=100 + 
q
3(hit + cit) + 
q
4oit + 
q
5fit + 
q
6hdit (13)
+q7cdit + 
q
8git + 
q
91[Lit > 5] + 
q
10NFit q = 1; :::; 5:
The inclusion of explanatory variables in the employment non-pecuniary utility ow equations
allows observable variables to have a direct impact on employment utility in addition to any e¤ect
that they may have on wages. For example, as people age it may be the case that physically demanding
occupations become less desirable relative to white collar employment. The cost function for attending
school is
cS(Sit) = s1ait + s2a
2
it=100 + s3hdit + s4cdit + s5hit + s6cit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
cSW (Sit) = sw1ait + sw2a
2
it=100 + sw3hit + sw4cit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
+sw6(hit  4) + sw7(hit = 4 \ cit  4) + sw8(cit  4): (14)
The deterministic portion of the unemployment utility ow, b(Sit), is set equal to zero because the
non-wage utility ow coe¢ cients are only identied relative to a base choice, as in any discrete choice
model.15
The nal utility ow equation represents the utility derived from earning a GED. The deterministic
portion of the GED utility ow is
cg(Sit) = g1 + g2ait. (15)
Within-rm job o¤er probabilities are specied as multinomial logit, so the probability of receiving a
15The specication of the schooling utility ow equation is based closely on Keane and Wolpin (1997). One of Keane
and Wolpins (1997) major ndings is that a bare bones" dynamic human capital model that excludes age e¤ects
and re-entry costs from the schooling utility ow equation is unable to match the rapid decine in schooling with age.
Including direct age e¤ects of this sort has become standard in the dynamic human capital literature. In addition, it
seems reasonable to believe that the e¤ort cost of schooling (or non-pecuniary consumption value) varies with age.
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job o¤er from occupation j at the current rm is
j =
exp(j)P5
k=1 exp(k)
: (16)
Finally, the discount factor, , is set equal to :95 rather than estimated because it can be di¢ cult to
estimate the discount factor in dynamic models, even though it is technically identied.16
4.2 The Likelihood Function
The solution to the dynamic programming problem provides the choice specic value functions which
are used in the construction of the likelihood function. Let  represent the parameters of the structural
model. Dene Oit as the observed outcome for person i at time t, which consists of an observed choice
and possibly an observed wage. The likelihood contribution for person i at time t is simply the joint
probability of the choice made by the person and the wage, if one is observed.
Conditional on having an endowment vector of type k, the likelihood contribution for person i is
the product of the probability of each outcome observed in the data over the eTi years that the person
remains in the sample,
Li( j i = k) =
Z
  
Z
[
Z Z 0@ eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j
; Sit; oit; fit;i = k)
1A (17)
dF (oi)dF (fi)]dF (
):
Note that the path probability for each person is integrated over the distributions of occupation
and rm specic human capital (oi and fi) because these variables are unobserved. The likelihood
contribution is also integrated over the joint distribution of 
 = f ; ; eg, because these match values
and choice specic utility shocks are not observed.
The high dimensional integrals in the likelihood function are approximated using simulation meth-
ods. The details of the simulation algorithm along with a derivation of the outcome probabilities are
provided in Appendix C. Let LSi ( j i = m) represent the simulated type-specic likelihood contri-
bution for person i. The simulated likelihood function for the sample is the product over the N people
16See Berkovec and Stern (1991) for an example of a model where it was not possible to estimate the discount factor.
Rust and Phelan (1997) nd that the likelihood function for their dynamic retirement model is very at as a function
of the discount factor, so they estimate the discount factor using a grid search. Keane and Wolpin (1997) are able to
estimate a yearly discount factor, their estimate is .936.
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in the sample of a weighted average of the type-specic simulated likelihoods, where the weights are
the type probabilities (m(hi1)),
LS( ) =
NY
i=1
MX
m=1
m(hi1)L
S
i ( j i = m): (18)
The vector of parameters b that maximizes equation number 18 is the simulated maximum likelihood
estimate of .
Standard errors are computed using a parametric bootstrap estimator of the covariance matrix of
b. This approach to estimating standard errors has been successfully applied in complex structural
models such as the one estimated by Engers and Stern (2002). The bootstrapped standard errors are
computed by using the parameter estimates b to simulate R samples of data, and then re-estimating
b using each simulated sample. The parameter estimates from the R simulated samples are used to
construct an estimate of the variance of the parameter vector. This procedure is extremely computer
intensive because the model has nearly 200 parameters that must be re-estimated for each simulated
sample. Also, recall that each likelihood evaluation is quite expensive because it involves solving the
dynamic programming problem. Given these considerations, the standard errors are estimated using
R = 35 simulated datasets.17
4.3 Identication
Although the career choice model is fairly complex and contains a large number of parameters it is still
fairly straightforward to provide some intuition for how the parameters of the model are identied. The
goal is to estimate the parameters of occupation specic wage o¤er equations along with parameters
of non-pecuniary utility ow equations. In many respects this situation is analogous to simple linear
estimation because the data contain information about the correlations between observable variables
and discrete choices and wages. Similarly, the parameters of the stochastic processes that allow for
17The computational burden of the parametric bootstrap may be lessened by taking k steps of a derivative based
optimization routine when estimating  for each simulated sample instead of allowing the optimization routine to
continue until convergence in each sample. In this work, experimentation showed that k = 4 provides a very close
approximation to the value of b that would be obtained if the number of optimization steps was not restricted: See
Davidson and MacKinnon (1999) for a detailed discussion of this k step parametric bootstrap.
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serially correlated unobservables within rms and occupations are identied by the panel nature of
the data.
Static sample selection models are also informative about identication of the structural model.
The data contain information about an individuals wages and occupational choices, but of course
wages are only observed for an individuals chosen occupation. The solution to the agents optimization
problem provides the sample selection rules that are used to estimate a selection corrected wage
equation for each occupation. The obvious analogy is to static selection models that are estimated
by maximum likelihood or by two-step procedures, and the major di¤erence between the static and
dynamic models is that the selection rules in the dynamic model are provided by the numerical solution
of the agents optimization problem.
Identication of the parameters of the non-pecuniary utility ow equations follows from the fact
that the data contain information about discrete career choices along with wages. It is possible to
estimate the e¤ects of observable variables on non-pecuniary utility because the data provide informa-
tion about the extent to which individualscareer choices are not completely explained by variation in
wages across occupations. To the extent that observed variables are correlated with observed choices
after conditioning on wages, this provides information about the impact of the observed variables on
non-pecuniary utility. For example, if college educated workers work as professionals more often then
one would expect solely based on occupational wage di¤erentials, this suggests that the professional
non-pecuniary utility ow is increasing in years of completed education.
5 Structural Parameter Estimates
Table 6, Panels A-D present the structural parameter estimates and the associated standard errors.
This section discusses selected parameter estimates and their implications for the career decision
process.
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5.1 Model Fit
Before discussing the parameter estimates it is useful to consider how well the model is able to match
the patterns found in the NLSY career choice and wage data. The estimated structural model is
used to simulate a sample of 4; 000 individuals whose career choices and wages are compared to those
observed in the data. The results of this exercise are presented in Figures 1-2 and Tables 3-5. Table 5
shows the means and standard deviations of accepted log wages in the NLSY and simulated data. The
discrepancies between simulated and actual mean log wages range from zero to :08 across occupations,
and the model also matches the standard deviations of wages in each occupation quite well. In addition,
Figure 1 shows that the model is able to match the age prole of wages extremely closely. The model
captures the general upward trend in mean wages and the sharp increase in mean wages that occurs
at college graduation quite precisely.
Tables 3 and 4 show how well the model ts the patterns of occupational mobility found in the
NLSY data. Table 3 shows that the model is able to match the rates of inter-rm and intra-rm occu-
pational mobility extremely well. The model captures the fact that inter-rm occupational switching
is more common that intra-rm occupational switching, and the model also matches the sharper down-
ward age trend in intra-rm occupational mobility. Table 4 shows that the model is also able to closely
match the occupational transition matrix found in the NLSY data, so the model generates patterns
in occupational mobility that are quite similar to those found in the NLSY. The diagonal elements of
Table 4 show that overall, the model tends to slightly overstate persistence in occupational choices,
but in general the models t to occupational mobility is quite good.
Figure 2 depicts choice proportions disaggregated by age for both the NLSY data and simulated
data. The model qualitatively ts the choices observed in the data quite well, in most cases closely
tracking both the levels of the choice proportions found in the NLSY data as well as the age trends. The
model closely matches the sharp upward age trend in professional and managerial employment found in
the NLSY data, and the model also matches the more gradual increase in craftsmen employment with
age. The model also captures the relatively at age patterns in the operatives and service occupations.
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Table 5: Wage Distribution: Actual & Simulated Data 
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Mean wage: NLSY data 9.78 9.58 9.37 9.51 9.25 
Mean wage: simulated data 9.78 9.59 9.38 9.54 9.33 
Wage std dev: NLSY data .54 .45 .45 .51 .47 
Wage std dev: simulated data .51 .48 .45 .50 .47 
Note: Simulated wages computed from a sample of 4,000 people. Yearly wages are in logs. 
 
 
Figure 1: Actual & Simulated Mean Log-wages 
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Table 7 
 Combined Returns to Firm & Occupation-Specific Capital vs. Gains from Job Search 
 Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Potential cumulative wage 
increase from firm & 
occupation-specific capital 
42% 27% 10% 13% 34% 
Potential wage gains from 
job search 
     
25th percentile match to 
75th 45% 
    
5th percentile match to 95th 147%     
Notes: Gains to firm and occupation-specific human capital are computed using the human capital level parameter estimates 
(potential wage increase = exp(firm HC level 3+ occ. HC level 3)-1). Gains to job search are based on the percentiles of the 
pecuniary job match value (ψ) distribution. 
The model tracks the downward age trend in school attendance extremely closely. The simulated data
reproduces the general qualitative age pattern in unemployment found in the NLSY data, although the
model under predicts the unemployment rate in the early to mid twenties. The model also overstates
employment in the sales and clerical occupation during the mid twenties.
5.2 The Log Wage Equation: Human Capital & Job Search
The estimates of the log wage equation parameters found in Table 6, Panel A reveal the importance
of education and occupation and rm specic human capital in determining wages in each occupation.
The e¤ects of high school and college on wages vary widely across the ve occupations, which suggests
that the types of skills produced by high school and college education are valued di¤erently across
occupations. The percent change in wages resulting from completing an additional year of high school
ranges from a low of 1:4% for craftsmen to a high of 5:6% for operatives and laborers. Interestingly, the
null hypothesis that the e¤ect of completing a year of high school has no e¤ect on wages is not rejected
at the 5% level for the craftsmen, sales and clerical, and service occupations. The monetary return
to attending college also varies widely across occupations, and is statistically di¤erent from zero in all
occupations. Completing a year of college increases wages by approximately 9:2% for professional and
managerial workers, while a year of college increases wages by only 3:2% for an operative or laborer.
The relationship between education and wages is convex in four out of the ve occupations, with only
operatives and laborers realizing a lower wage gain from college education than high school education.
The nding that the wage function is convex in schooling di¤ers from the results of most studies of
the relationship between schooling and wages which typically assume linearity (Card 1999). A notable
exception is Belzil and Hansen (2002) who also nd a convex schooling-wage function based on their
estimates of a dynamic programming model of schooling and employment choices. In the present
model, the average return per year of education from grade ten to sixteen is 7:3% for professional and
managerial workers, 3:2% for craftsmen, 4:2% for operatives and laborers, 5:4% for sales and clerical
workers, and 6:7% for service workers. These results are consistent with the relatively low average
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Figure 2 
Choice Proportions by Age: Actual and Simulated Data 
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return to schooling of 7% per year reported by Belzil and Hansen (2002), given that they do not allow
the returns to schooling to vary by occupation.18 The results also support the ndings of Manski and
Pepper (2000), who question the validity of the extremely high returns to schooling obtained in many
studies that use instrumental variables techniques.19
The point estimate of the e¤ect of a GED on wages ranges from :10% to 5:6% across the ve
occupations, although the e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent from zero in any occupation. These
results are consistent with those of Cameron and Heckman (1993), who nd that the GED does not
have a positive e¤ect on wages using a regression which assumes that earning a GED is exogenous.
At the other extreme, Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000) use a natural experiment approach based
on variation in the GED passing standard across states to determine that the GED increases wage by
10  19%.
The estimates of the rm and occupation specic human capital parameters are presented in the
bottom half of Table 6, Panel A. These parameters measure the change in log wages accruing to workers
as their rm specic capital increases. For example, moving to the second rm specic human capital
level increases a professionals wage by approximately 12%, and moving to the third level results in
an additional increase of 5:9%. The relationship between rm specic capital and wages is concave
for professionals, sales, and service workers, and convex for craftsmen (level 2: 4:1%, level 3: 10:9%).
The importance of rm specic capital varies widely across occupations, with operatives and laborers
realizing the lowest wage increases with rm tenure (9:7% at level 3), and service workers realizing the
largest gains (25:4% at level 3). Across all occupations the probability of rm specic skill increase
is essentially equal to one, so wages increase quickly with rm tenure for two years before levelling
out.20 During estimation these probabilities converged to numbers that were essentially equal to one,
18The model estimated by Belzil and Hansen (2002) (B&H) shares the basic methodology used in this study, as both
studies estimate a dynamic programming model of education and earnings, but there are many di¤erences between the
models. A few of the larger di¤erences are: 1)B&H focus on education so they do not model occupational choices, 2)
school interuption is exogenous in B&H, while it is endogenous in the present model, 3) B&H abstract away from rm
and occupation specic capital and job matching since their focus is on education, 4) B&H use a more exible spline
function specication of the returns to education.
19Manski and Pepper (2000) use a monotone IV assumption to determine that the upper bound on the increase in
log-wages from completing four years of college is .39. In this paper, the estimated returns to completing college range
from .37 for professionals and managers to .13 for operatives and laborers.
20Rapid wage growth with rm tenure early in jobs that subsides at higher levels of tenure has been found in several
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Table 6: Panel A 
 Structural Model Estimates 
 
                          Occupations 
Variable Professional 
& managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
laborers 
Sales & 
clerical 
Service 
Log Wage Equation:      
Age (β1) -.019 
(.011) 
.098 
(.011) 
.003 
(.008) 
.036 
(.015) 
-.010 
(.010) 
Age2/100 (β2) .085 
(.046) 
-.406 
(.050) 
.036 
(.037) 
-.037 
(.071) 
.206 
(.051) 
Years of high school (β3) .048 
(.016) 
.014 
(.011) 
.056 
(.009) 
.029 
(.020) 
.021 
(.012) 
Years of college (β4) .092 
(.007) 
.047 
(.008) 
.032 
(.008) 
.072 
(.005) 
.103 
(.009) 
Age ≤ 17 (β5) -.272 
(.066) 
-.069 
(.058) 
-.196 
(.033) 
-.180 
(.055) 
-.032 
(.036) 
18 ≤ Age ≤ 21 (β6) -.270 
(.022) 
-.036 
(.019) 
-.162 
(.015) 
-.194 
(.021) 
-.042 
(.018) 
GED (β7) .021 
(.037) 
.001 
(.047) 
.056 
(.042) 
.021 
(.043) 
.011 
(.036) 
Firm-specific HC: level  1 (β8) .000& 
 
.000&
 
.000&
 
.000&
 
.000&
 
Firm-specific HC: level 2 (β9) .119 
(.012) 
.041 
(.015) 
.044 
(.012) 
.081 
(.014) 
.157 
(.023) 
Firm-specific HC: level 3 (β10) .179 
(.011) 
.109 
(.015) 
.097 
(.015) 
.124 
(.020) 
.254 
(.021) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 1 (β11) .000& 
 
.000& 
 
.000& 
 
.000& 
 
.000& 
 
Occupation-specific HC: level 2 (β12) .024 
(.020) 
.092 
(.016) 
.000 
(---) 
.000 
(---) 
.046 
(.015) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 3 (β13) .172 
(.018) 
.130 
(.026) 
.000 
(---) 
.000 
(---) 
.046 
(.015) 
Probability that firm-specific human 
capital increases (λf) 
.999 
(---) 
.999 
(---) 
.999 
(---) 
.999 
(---) 
.999 
(---) 
Probability that occupation-specific 
human capital increases (λf) 
.777 
(.061) 
.463 
(.018) 
.999 
(---) 
.189 
(.040) 
.999 
(---) 
Error Standard Deviations Estimate Stan. Error    
True randomness in wages (σe) .309 0.001    
Non-Pecuniary firm match value (σξ) .000 ---    
Pecuniary firm match value (σψ) .276 0.004    
Extreme value parameter (τ) 3.29 0.189    
Log-likelihood -15,252     
Notes:  & indicates the parameter is fixed at the stated value and not estimated because it is not identified. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. (---) denotes parameters which were fixed during estimation at the stated value, so standard errors are not reported. 
Age is measured as true age minus 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
so these parameters were xed at the stated value during estimation. For this reason, bootstrapped
standard errors are not reported for these parameters.
The importance of occupation specic capital varies widely across occupations. Both operatives
and laborers and sales and clerical workers realize essentially no gain from occupation specic capital,
and service workers realize a relatively modest gain of 4:6% when their occupation specic skills reach
the highest level. In contrast, professional and managerial workers realize a wage gain of 17% at the
third level occupation specic capital, while craftsmen experience a wage gain of 13% at the third
level. The relationship between wages and occupation specic capital is convex for professionals and
managers, since moving to the second occupation specic capital level increases wages by only 2:4%,
while moving to the third level increases wages by nearly an additional 15%. In contrast, craftsmen
realize a large wage gain of 9:2% when moving to the second occupation specic capital level, but
moving to the next level increases wages by only an additional 3:8%. In addition, the probability of
occupation specic skill increase is substantially lower for craftsmen compared to professionals (:46
vs. :77).21
One important consideration is the extent to which the discrete levels of rm and occupation
specic human capital are able to capture the patterns in wage growth found in the NLSY. Most
of the skill increase probabilities are very close to one, so wages will increase early in jobs but the
highest level of human capital will be reached quickly. The concern is that the discrete levels approach
will understate on-the-job wage growth. Unfortunately, keeping track of years of human capital is
not feasible given that the state space of the model is already very large. One way of addressing
this concern is by comparing OLS estimates of a quadratic specication of a simple wage equation
to one that uses three discrete levels to capture the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human
capital. These specications of the wage equation provide virtually the same t to the data, with
R2(quadratic) = :3063 and R2(levels) = :3007, and both specications contain the same number of
studies. For example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) nd that the rst year of tenure increases wages by 11%. Dustman
and Meghir (2005) report returns to rm tenure for unskilled German workers of 4% per year during the rst 5 years of
tenure, but the returns are zero for higher levels of tenure.
21See Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) for estimates of the return to occupation tenure under the assumption that
the returns to human capital are identical across all occupations.
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parameters. It appears that modelling human capital using a discrete number of human capital levels
performs extremely well relative to the commonly estimated quadratic functional form, and does not
lead to a serious underestimate of the importance of rm and occupation specic human capital.22
The estimates of the standard deviations of the random wage shock (e) and pecuniary job match
value ( ) show that both job matching and random wage shocks play an important role in determining
wages, and suggest that mobility between rms provides the opportunity for substantial wage increases.
Table 7 quanties the monetary gains to job search (moving to a higher  ij) relative to the gains from
rm and occupation specic human capital accumulation. The rst row of Table 7 shows the percent
increase in wages in each occupation accruing to a worker who reaches the highest levels of both rm
and occupation specic human capital, while the bottom row depicts the wage gains from moving to
higher percentiles of the job match distribution. The potential wage increase from the combination of
rm and occupation specic capital varies widely across occupations, ranging from a low of 10% for
operatives and laborers to a high of 42% for professionals and managers. There are also substantial
gains to job search: a worker who is able to move from the 25th to 75th percentile of the match value
distribution realizes a wage gain from job search of 45% (exp(:186  [ :186])  1 = :45). These results
indicate that both human capital accumulation and job search play important roles in determining
wage growth over the career, but the relative importance of each e¤ect varies by occupation. The
primary source of wage growth for operatives and laborers and sales and clerical workers is nding a
good rm match, while in the other occupations the wage gains from human capital accumulation are
quite large relative to the potential gains from job search.
5.3 Career Choices & Heterogeneity in Skills and Preferences
Table 6, Panel B presents the estimates of the log-wage equation intercepts and non-pecuniary utility
ow intercepts for each of the four types of people in the model, along with the estimated proportion
of each type in the population.
22 It is important to remember that this analysis focuses on young men at the start of their career (ages 16-30), so
average rm tenure and occupation tenure are only 2.2 and 2.4 years. Given this feature of the data, it is perhaps not
surprising that the discrete levels approach performs so well.
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The log wage intercepts represent skill endowments in each of the ve occupations. The estimates
of the wage intercepts show that there is substantial variation in market ability both across and
within types. Type 1s have the highest ability in each occupation, while type 2s have approximately
the second highest ability in all occupations except service. Di¤erences in the log wage intercepts
correspond approximately to percentage changes in wages, so a persons endowment type greatly
inuences their expected earnings in each occupation. For example, holding the e¤ects of all state
variables constant, a type 1 persons expected wage in the sales and clerical occupation is approximately
37% higher than a type 2s expected wage, 44% higher than a type 3s expected wage, and 55% higher
than a type 4s expected wage. Across occupations, professional and managerial ability varies the
most in the population (standard deviation=.27), while the service occupation has the least dispersion
in ability (standard deviation=.13).
The non-pecuniary intercepts reect a persons preferences for working in each occupation and
attending school. These parameters are measured in log yearly wage units relative to the base
choice of unemployment. The non-wage employment intercepts are negative across all occupations and
types, which indicates that people experience disutility from employment relative to leisure. The non-
wage employment intercepts vary widely across occupations, which indicates that there is substantial
heterogeneity in preferences for employment in di¤erent occupations across people.
The preference for attending school (or school ability) represents the consumption value of school
net of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of attending school. The value of attending school varies
substantially across types, from a low of 6:07 log yearly wage units for type 1s, to a high of 16:77 for
type 2s. The disaggregation of ability into market skills and school ability or preference shows that
the two dimensions of ability are far from perfectly positively correlated. Type 1s have the highest
market ability in each occupation but the lowest schooling ability.
Table 8 quanties the impact of heterogeneity in skills and preferences on career outcomes by
summarizing career choices for each endowment type based on simulated data generated from the
structural model. At age 21 there are already substantial di¤erences in career outcomes across types.
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Table 6: Panel B 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Log-wage Intercepts     
Professional & managerial (μ1) 9.68 
(.057) 
9.24 
(.053) 
8.97 
(.055) 
9.01 
(.061) 
Craftsmen (μ2) 9.11 
(.075) 
8.88 
(.082) 
8.66 
(.075) 
8.73 
(.02) 
Operatives & laborers (μ3) 9.35 
(.051) 
9.00 
(.046) 
8.99 
(.046) 
8.82 
(.049) 
Sales & clerical (μ4) 9.32 
(.110) 
8.95 
(.110) 
8.87 
(.112) 
8.76 
(.113) 
Service (μ5) 9.16 
(.063) 
8.84 
(.068) 
8.84 
(.058) 
8.85 
(.068) 
Non-pecuniary Intercepts     
Professional & managerial (φ1) -28.35 
(1.60) 
-25.34 
(1.35) 
-27.56 
(1.55) 
-37.21 
(2.06) 
Craftsmen (φ2) -21.33 
(1.00) 
-23.82 
(1.14) 
-21.00 
(.95) 
-28.06 
(1.31) 
Operatives & laborers (φ3) -16.20 
(.79) 
-14.54 
(.79) 
-15.53 
(.83) 
-20.90 
(1.16) 
Sales & clerical (φ4) -22.86 
(1.01) 
-19.90 
(.97) 
-23.00 
(1.08) 
-26.97 
(1.27) 
Service (φ5) -19.34 
(.85) 
-16.42 
(.79) 
-18.80 
(.81) 
-23.95 
(1.04) 
School (φs) 6.07 
(.63) 
16.77 
(1.30) 
 
6.85 
(.68) 
 
7.44 
(.74) 
 
Type Probabilities    
Initial schooling > 9 years .301 
(.025) 
.330 
(.046) 
.331 
(.021) 
.038 
(.002) 
Initial schooling ≤ 9 years .218 
(.016) 
.144 
(.049) 
.474 
(.029) 
.163 
(.010) 
                                   Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Table 6: Panel C 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate 
Discount factor (δ) .95& Switching Costs  
School Utility Flow  Firm to firm transitions (α10) -2.61 (0.27) 
Age (γs1) -3.68 
(.33) 
School re-entry (γs7) -2.38 
(0.30) 
Age2/100 (γs2) 9.59 
(1.41) 
 New job from non-employment (α9) -2.66 
(0.27) 
Attending college (γs3) .66 
(.55) 
Costs of Working while Attending School  
Attending graduate school (γs4) -2.26 
(.69) 
Work in high school (γsw6) 6.50 
(0.62) 
Years of high school (γs5) .56 
(.14) 
Work in college (γsw7) 11.55 
(0.79) 
Years of college (γs6) .49 
(.12) 
Work in graduate school (γsw8) 12.09 
(0.94) 
School While Employed Utility Flow  Within-firm Job Offer Probabilities  
Age (γsw1) -5.27 
(.31) 
Offer from professional & managerial (π1) 0.25 
(0.01) 
Age2/100 (γsw2) 24.75 
(1.50) 
Offer from craftsmen (π2) 0.21 
(0.01) 
Years of high school (γsw3) 4.15 
(.29) 
Offer from operatives & laborers (π3) 0.23 
(0.01) 
Years of college (γsw4) 1.07 
(.17) 
Offer from sales & clerical (π4) 0.23 
(0.01) 
  Offer from service (π5) 0.09 (0.01) 
 
 
Table 6: Panel D 
Structural Model Estimates 
            Occupations
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Employment Non-Pecuniary 
Utility Flows:
     
Age (α1) 1.92 (.24) 
2.04 
(.19) 
0.86 
(.14) 
1.76 
(.17) 
0.86 
(.14) 
Age2/100 (α2) -8.02 (.96) 
-10.10 
(1.02) 
-4.11 
(.66) 
-10.69 
(1.06) 
-4.03 
(.72) 
Education (α3) 0.81 (.13) 
-0.65 
(.12) 
-0.62 
(.14) 
0.26 
(.16) 
0.02 
(.12) 
Occupation-Specific HC (α4) 5.53 (.37) 
3.66 
(.305) 
2.53 
(.21) 
2.22 
(.22) 
2.08 
(.22) 
Firm-Specific HC (α5) 2.03 (.18) 
2.52 
(.22) 
2.08 
(.17) 
2.56 
(.17) 
2.42 
(.23) 
High school diploma (α6) 0.62 (.43) 
2.26 
(.41) 
1.75 
(.34) 
1.86 
(.42) 
0.74 
(.34) 
College diploma (α7) 2.49 (.33) 
4.82 
(.64) 
4.32 
(.46) 
5.15 
(.58) 
3.54 
(.56) 
GED (α8) 1.43 (.56) 
1.72 
(.68) 
2.34 
(.45) 
1.73 
(.48) 
2.99 
(.49) 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
Approximately 75% of the highest schooling ability people, type 2s, are attending school at age 21. In
contrast, the majority of type 1 and 2s have nished attending school and are working in blue collar
occupations as craftsmen or operatives and laborers. Type 4s, who experience the highest disutility
from working and also have the lowest endowment of market ability have a 77% unemployment rate
at age 21. At age 27 types have specialized in di¤erent types of employment as a result of variation
in skills and preferences. Type 2s are essentially white collar workers, since 56% are employed as
professionals and managers, and 28% are employed as sales and clerical workers.
The nal section of Table 8 shows how heterogeneity impacts wages and utility by showing the mean
simulated value functions along with mean accepted wages for each type at age 27. The discounted
expected value of lifetime utility at age 27 for a type 2 worker is approximately 1.5 times higher than
a type 1 or type 3 worker, and is 5 times higher than a type 4 worker. Type 4 workers on average
spend a large portion of their careers unemployed due to both low market skills and high employment
disutility.23
The variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across types suggests that skill and prefer-
ence heterogeneity is an important determinant of welfare inequality. A regression of the discounted
expected value of lifetime utility on type dummy variables explains 56% of the variation in lifetime
utility across people, so heterogeneity in skills and preferences is a key determinant of welfare. One
implication of this result is that job search models that do not incorporate occupations are missing
a key determinant of welfare. The remaining 44% of variation in utility is caused by random shocks
to wages and non-pecuniary utility ows, the arrival of job matches, and randomness in human cap-
ital improvement. To put this result in context, Keane and Wolpin (1997) nd that heterogeneity in
schooling ability and market ability explains 90% of the variation in lifetime utility. The addition of
job search, rm specic capital, and random shocks to non-pecuniary utility to an occupational choice
model reduces the importance of permanent heterogeneity in determining welfare, but its impact is
23Bayes rule can be used to calculate conditional type probabilities for each person in the sample and see if
they are related to family background characteristics. The results of this exercise are available at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~paulsull/supplement.pdf. As in Keane and Wolpin (1997), there is a strong positive correlation
between parental income and education levels and the probability that an individual is a white collar, high education
type.
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Table 8: Simulated Choice Frequencies by Endowment Type 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Choice percentages at age 21     
Attending school 4.48% 75.54% 6.29% 12.91% 
Unemployed 12.85% 8.84% 13.41% 77.51% 
Professional & managerial 6.72% 12.63% 7.66% 0.00% 
Craftsmen 22.29% 2.64% 20.62% 2.39% 
Operatives & laborers 27.95% 7.35% 30.20% 3.35% 
Sales & Clerical 11.79% 19.40% 11.13% 2.39% 
Service 16.86% 11.02% 14.78% 2.87% 
Choice percentages at age 27     
Attending school .79% 16.15% 1.71% 1.37% 
Unemployed 3.01% 2.00% 3.41% 59.59% 
Professional & managerial 28.48% 56.15% 26.46% 2.74% 
Craftsmen 32.91% 1.23% 27.68% 7.53% 
Operatives & laborers 22.78% 3.08% 28.90% 13.70% 
Sales & clerical 6.49% 28.48% 4.88% 10.27% 
Service 6.33% 8.31% 8.66% 5.48% 
Value functions & wages at 
age 27 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. dev. 
Value function of optimal 
choice at age 27 
43.66 7.94 70.23 8.92 44.88 7.96 14.04 5.49 
Wage at age 27 9.95 .42 9.92 .42 9.45 .40 9.42 .47 
Notes: Based on a simulation of 4,000 people. Average simulated wages are conditional on employment.  
 
Table 9: The Impact of Human Capital, Job Matching, and Occupational Matching on 
Welfare and Wages 
Counterfactuals Total Log-Wages Total Utility 
 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Baseline (estimated model) 265,321 --- 210,623 --- 
1) Eliminate effect of firm and 
occupation specific capital on wages 257,860 -2.8% 205,479 -2.4% 
2) Eliminate effect of education on 
wages 255,317 -3.8% 201,413 -4.4% 
3) Workers randomly assigned to firms, 
never allowed to switch firms 213,844 -19% 138,568 -34% 
4) Workers randomly assigned to 
occupations, never allowed to switch 
occupations 
 
183,030 
 
-31% 176,478 -16% 
Notes: Computed using samples of 4,000 simulated people. Total wages and utility are the sums of accepted wages and 
realized one period utility flows over people and years. See Section 6.2 of the text for a description of the restrictions 
imposed under each counterfactual. 
still substantial.24
6 Counterfactual Experiments
The rst set of counterfactuals examines the contributions of human capital, job matching, and occu-
pational matching to the wages and total utility of workers.25
6.1 A Restricted Model
Before presenting the counterfactuals that quantify the importance of matching between workers and
occupations, it is useful to begin by estimating a restricted model that rules out heterogeneity in
workersoccupation specic abilities and preferences. This restriction is imposed by estimating the
model under the restriction that there is only one type of person, so all workers have identical abilities
() and preferences (). When the null version of the model is estimated, the value of the log-likelihood
function is  19; 347. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the null hypothesis of homogeneity in
occupation specic skills and preferences is 8; 190, so the null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected at
any conventional signicance level. The large decrease in the log-likelihood function when unobserved
heterogeneity is eliminated shows that this feature of the model is necessary to match occupational
choices and career outcomes.
6.2 The Value of Human Capital, Job Matching, and Occupational Matching
The rst row of Table 9 shows the total log-wages earned and utility realized by workers in 4,000
simulated careers generated from the structural model. This baseline simulation is based on the
model as specied in Section 3 along with the simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates.
Comparing the baseline simulation to simulations that implement counterfactual changes in the model
24 In addition to the previously stated di¤erences between Keane and Wolpin (1997) and the present model, other key
di¤erences that may impact the importance of permanent heterogeneity are the level of aggregation of civilian occupations
(ve compared to two in K+W), the exclusion of military employment from the present model, and the inclusion of
heterogeneity in employment preferences along with heterogeneity in ability in the present model. In addition, it is
possible that the use of a continuous match value distribution and discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution could
tend to understate the importance of permanent heterogeneity.
25 It should be noted that these counterfactual simulations are partial equilibrium in nature. These simulations quantify
the e¤ect of changing various parameters on career outcomes, holding all other structural parameters in the model
constant. Also, one should keep in mind the fact that these results are based on the NLSY79 cohort of young men used
to estimate the model.
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provides information about the e¤ects of human capital, job search, and occupational matching on
total earnings (log-wages) and the welfare of workers (total utility). The rst counterfactual examines
the impact of rm and occupation specic human capital on wages and utility by eliminating the wage
e¤ects of these types of human capital, calculating the value functions under this restriction, and then
using the new value functions to simulate career choices. The e¤ects of rm and occupation specic
human capital on wages are eliminated by setting the following wage equation parameters equal to
zero: qj = 0; q = 1; :::; 5; j = 8; :::; 13. Eliminating the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic capital
on wages decreases total earnings by 2.8%, while the total utility realized by workers in the simulated
economy decreases by 2.4%.
The counterfactuals measure the net e¤ect of each change, which includes many o¤setting behav-
ioral e¤ects. For example, one e¤ect of eliminating the returns to rm and occupation specic capital
is to decrease wages because this change eliminates on the job wage growth. This e¤ect is o¤set to
some degree by the fact that eliminating on the job wage growth reduces moving costs in the form of
human capital that is lost when workers switch rms or occupations. This counterfactual produces
relatively small changes in the baseline choice distribution. The largest e¤ect is found in the propor-
tion of years spent unemployed, which increases by approximately one percentage point. The diagonal
elements in the baseline transition matrix shown in Table 4 all decrease by small amounts ranging from
-.10 percentage points for laborers to -1.2 percentage points for service workers. The relatively small
changes in the choice distribution and transition matrix show that occupational choices are primarily
determined by endowments of skills and preferences, not the heterogeneity across occupations in the
e¤ects of rm and occupation specic capital on wages.
The second counterfactual quanties the impact of education on wages by showing how wages and
total utility would change if the pecuniary returns to education were eliminated. This restriction is
imposed by setting the e¤ects of high school and college education on wages equal to zero across all
occupations (q3 = 0; 
q
4 = 0; q = 1; :::; 5). The results of this counterfactual, shown in Table 9, reveal
that the combined pecuniary value of high school and college education is 3.8% of total earnings, while
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the total social value is 4.4% of total utility. This counterfactual simulation captures the net e¤ect
of eliminating the returns to education, where the wage losses from the reduction in human capital
are o¤set to some extent because a decrease in the payo¤ to attending school increases the number of
years worked by the average person in the simulated sample. The total value of education is larger
than the pecuniary value because when the pecuniary return to education is eliminated people choose
to accumulate less schooling, which decreases non-pecuniary utility because there is a consumption
value to attending school and because education increases the employment non-pecuniary utility ow
in many occupations. Interestingly, eliminating the returns to education has relatively small e¤ects
on occupational choices. The simulated occupational choice proportions all change by less than one
percentage point under this counterfactual, so the di¤erential returns to education across occupations
are not a large determinant of sorting across occupations.
The third and fourth counterfactuals shown in Table 9 examine the pecuniary and total gains to
matching between workers and rms and workers and occupations. The benets to workers resulting
from job search are quantied in the third counterfactual, where workers are randomly matched to
rms and not allowed to switch rms during their career. In this world, the gains to job search are
eliminated because workers are unable to search for jobs across rms. However, workers are free
to self select into their optimal occupation. This counterfactual shows that eliminating job search
reduces total earnings by 19%. The total value of job search is even larger than the monetary gains:
eliminating job search decreases the total utility of workers by 34%. Note that the value of job search
to society dwarfs the social value of human capital. The combined total value of education and rm
and occupation specic capital is approximately one-third as large as the value of job search (7% of
total utility vs. 34%).
The value of workers self selecting into occupations (and switching occupations) is captured in the
fourth counterfactual, where each worker is randomly matched to an occupation for his entire career.
This counterfactual eliminates occupational mobility as well as self selection in occupational choices
based on abilities and preferences, but workers are free to move between rms over the course of
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their career. Randomly assigning workers to occupations reduces total earnings by 31%, so there are
substantial monetary gains to society from allowing workers to match themselves to occupations based
on their skills and preferences. The total utility gain that is attributed to workers making optimal
occupational choices and occupational mobility decisions is equal to 16% of total utility.
The counterfactual experiments presented in this section quantify the gains arising from the mo-
bility of workers across rms and occupations as they make optimal career decisions. Although the
estimated structural wage equation indicates that there are substantial pecuniary returns to occu-
pation and rm specic human capital, the counterfactual simulations show that job search and self
selection into occupations are far more important determinants of wages and total utility. The large
gains arising from mobility between rms and occupations suggest that it is crucial to incorporate
both job search and occupational choices when studying labor market dynamics since they are both
key determinants of total earnings and overall utility.
6.3 Quantifying the Importance of Comparative Advantage
The previously discussed counterfactuals indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in abilities
and preferences across workers. One way of assessing the importance of comparative advantage e¤ects
is to examine how an individuals wages and career outcomes are altered when they are forced to choose
a specic occupation other than their optimal occupation. Rather than consider all of the possible
combinations of optimal and assigned occupations, this section focuses on two counterfactual scenarios.
What would happen to professionals and managers if they were forced to work as operatives and
laborers? What would happen to operatives and laborers if they were forced to work as professionals
and managers?
When all professional and managerial workers are forced to work as operatives and laborers, the
average log wage of these workers decreases by :33 from 9:78 to 9:45. When workers are switched
across these occupations in the opposite direction, the average wage for laborers assigned to work as
professionals decreases from 9:38 as laborers to 9:21 as professionals.26 This simulation demonstrates
26Notice that professionals have an absolute advantage in both high and low skill employment.
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that comparative advantage in occupational choices holds: professionals and laborers both do much
better in their chosen occupation than when they are forced to switch occupations.
7 Conclusion
This paper formulates and structurally estimates a dynamic model of educational attainment, occupa-
tional choices, and job search that incorporates self-selection in occupational and educational choices,
endogenous accumulation of rm and occupation specic human capital, and job search based on rm
level wage and non-pecuniary matching. The model integrates the dynamic human capital occupa-
tional choice framework developed by Keane and Wolpin (1997) with the job search approach to labor
market dynamics. The benet of developing a model that nests both of these approaches to analyzing
career choices is that the estimated model provides evidence about the relative importance of features
of human capital models relative to features of job search models in explaining the determination of
wages and total utility over the career.
The estimated structural wage o¤er equation shows that wages tend to increase with both rm and
occupation specic capital, and that the human capital wage function varies widely across occupations.
The potential total wage gains from rm and occupation specic capital range from a low of 10% for
operatives and laborers to a high of 42% for professionals and managers. In addition, there is a
considerable amount of heterogeneity in occupation specic ability, school ability, and preferences
for employment in di¤erent occupations. This heterogeneity accounts for approximately 56% of the
variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across people.
Although the estimated wage equation shows that the gains from human capital are substantial, it
is di¢ cult to determine the importance of occupation and rm specic human capital relative to the
importance of job search and occupational matching by simply examining the parameter estimates.
As a result, the structural model is used to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the
contributions of human capital accumulation, job search, and occupational matching to total income
and overall welfare. These simulations reveal that eliminating the pecuniary returns to rm and
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occupation specic human capital would reduce wages by 2.8%, eliminating occupational matching
would reduce wages by 31%, and eliminating the gains to rm matching would reduce wages by 19%.
These results indicate that the importance of labor mobility in determining wages far exceeds the
importance of human capital. Workers realize large gains as they make optimal occupational choices
and inter-rm mobility decisions, which implies that policies that promote worker mobility by lowering
mobility costs or search frictions have the potential to increase wages and welfare by promoting the
e¢ cient assignment of workers to rms and occupations.
Appendix A: Data Aggregation
Yearly school attendance is assigned using detailed information on monthly school attendance
and grade completion. The methodology used to assign yearly school attendance consists of several
steps. First, the amount of education accumulated by each sample member over the sample period is
determined. Then, starting in the rst year, individuals are considered to be attending school if they
report attending school during the year and completing a grade by the next year. If this approach
fails to assign all the accumulated years of education, then the process is repeated using the weaker
requirement that the person reports completing a grade or attending school during a year.
Yearly employment status is determined using the weekly labor force record. The yearly employ-
ment activity is the activity (a specic employer or unemployment) in which the most weeks were
spent during the year. The number of weeks spent unemployed and employed full time at each em-
ployer are counted for each decision year. Jobs consisting of less than twenty hours of work per week
are counted as time spent unemployed. The work activity in which the most weeks were spent during
the school year is coded as the yearly labor force activity. Given the assumption that employment is
full-time, an individuals wage is converted into a yearly wage by multiplying the hourly wage by 2,000
hours. Respondents are dropped from the sample if they provide insu¢ cient information to construct
a history of educational attainment. Respondents are also dropped from the sample if they ever serve
in the military or work as a farmer.
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Transitions between rms are identied using the NLSY survey variables that indicate whether or
not a current employer is the same as an employer in the previous year. One unavoidable consequence
of the aggregation of weekly data into yearly data is that yearly data understate the number of
transitions between rms. One way of assessing the e¤ects of aggregation is to compare the average
number of jobs that a person holds over the sample period using di¤erent levels of aggregation. Using
the weekly NLSY employment record, the average number of jobs is 11. When the data are aggregated
to half-yearly, the average number of jobs falls to 7. Using yearly data, the average number of jobs
is 6. The e¤ects of aggregation are fairly large when moving from weekly to half-yearly data, but
relatively small when moving from half-yearly to yearly data.27
Appendix B: Model Solution
B1: Simulating Emax. The Emax integrals do not have closed form solutions, so they are
approximated using simulation methods. At this point it is useful to partition the vector of error
terms, excluding ", into two sets. Let 
t = f ; ; eg be the set of errors whose future realizations are
unknown to the agent at time t; and dene the joint density of these errors as f(
t). Recall that the
vector of skill endowments and preferences is i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g. Conditional on 
t
and rm and occupation specic human capital (ft and ot), the expected value of the maximum has
a closed form solution because of the assumption that " is distributed extreme value,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " j 
t;i; ot; ftg = ( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt j 
t;i; ot; ft)

)]) (19)
= 	(dt j
t;i; ot; ft) ;
where V (dt) = V (dt) ",  is Eulers constant, and  is a parameter of the extreme value distribution.
Let f() represent the density of the variable in parentheses. Integrating over the distributions of 
t,
ft and ot provides the unconditional expected value of the best choice available next period for each
endowment type,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " jig =
Z Z Z
  
Z
	(dt j
t;i; ot; ft)f(
t)d
t

f(ft)dftf(ot)dot: (20)
27Hall (1982) provides a basis for comparison, reporting that workers, on average, hold 10 jobs over the course of their
careers. Similarly, Topel and Ward (1992) nd that workers hold 7 jobs in the rst 10 years of their careers.
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This integral does not have an analytical solution, so it is simulated using R draws from the joint
density f(
t). In this work, R = 40.28 The integral over the distribution of human capital is simply a
probability weighted sum because the distribution of human capital is discrete. Let r index simulation
draws, and the simulated integral is simply the average of equation 20 over the R draws,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + "j ig = 1
R
RX
r=1
PX
h=1
Pr[ft = ft(h) j ft 1]
PX
z=1
Pr[ot = ot(z) j ot 1]
	(dt j
rt ;i; ozt ; fht ): (21)
The other Emax terms found in the value function calculations are also approximated using this
method.
B2: Interpolation. This paper implements a new interpolating regression function that takes
advantage of the assumption that the error term " is distributed extreme value. This regression
function has the desirable theoretical property that it converges to the exact solution for Emax as ;
 ; and e approach 0. In addition, it also satises the theoretical restrictions on the Emax function
outlined in McFadden (1981). Another important property of this regression function is that the
regressor is dened at every point in the state space even if the set of feasible state points varies over
the state space, as it does in this model. In contrast, the regression function proposed by Keane and
Wolpin (1994) uses the value functions corresponding to each element in the choice set separately as
regressors, which creates a missing data problem when the choice set is state dependant.29 If the only
source of randomness in the model was the error term ", then the expected value of the maximum
would have the closed form solution shown in equation 19. This is not the case in this model due to
the existence of the wage match values ( ), non-wage match values (), and random wage shocks (e),
28Antithetic acceleration is used throughout estimation to reduce variance of the simulated integrals. See Geweke
(1988) for a discussion of antithetic acceleration, and Stern (1997) for a review of the applications of simulation methods
in the economics literature.
29One solution to this problem would be to use a di¤erent interpolating regression for each feasible choice set in the
state space. Depending on the exact details of the model, this approach has two potential drawbacks: 1) small sample
sizes in each individual regression, 2) the need to estimate a large number of interpolating regressions.
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but it suggests the following functional form for the interpolating regression,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " g = !0t + !1t( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt )

)]) (22)
= !0t + !1t	(dt) :
The parameters !0t and !1t are estimated by OLS, and allowed to vary over time. During estimation,
the value functions are simulated at approximately 1% of the state space and interpolated at the
remaining points. Experimentation shows that the actual and interpolated value functions di¤er by
approximately 1% on average.
Appendix C: Evaluating the Likelihood Function
C1: Simulation of the Likelihood Function.The high dimensional integrals in the likelihood
function are simulated using R draws from the joint distribution of 
 and Q draws from the joint
distribution of occupation and rm specic human capital. The integral over the joint distribution
of human capital is simulated using a modied Geweke, Keane, and Hajivassiliou (GHK) algorithm
because the joint distribution of human capital is intractably complex. The type-specic simulated
likelihood contribution is
LSi ( j i = k) =
1
R
RX
r=1
1
Q
QX
q=1
eTiY
t=1
Pr[Orqit j
ri ; oqit; f qit;; Sit;i = k): (23)
C2: Simulation of the Likelihood Function. With the exception of the integrals over the
distributions of rm and occupation specic human capital, all integrals are simulated using simple
frequency simulators. This type of simulator is not practical in the case of the integral over fit and
oit because the distributions of these unobserved state variables are intractably complex. The integral
that needs to be evaluated is the path probability over the sample period, denoted  . The equation
for this probability is
  =
Z Z eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j; Sit;i = k; oit; fit]dF (oi)dF (fi):
Note that the integral is over the joint distribution of fi and oi over the entire eTi years that person
i remains in the sample. Human capital evolves randomly conditional on career choices, so there
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are an enormous number of possible sequences of human capital that could occur. Calculating this
distribution for each sample person is not practical. The solution is to use a modied GHK algorithm
to simulate the integral. The intuition behind this method is the same as in Brien, Lillard, and Stern
(2006). The complete algorithm is outlined below.
1. Draw ort j ort 1 and f rt j f rt 1:
2. Compute Pr[Oit j ort ; f rt ]:
3. Compute  r =  r  Pr[Oit j ort ; f rt ]:
4. If t = eTi, go to step 5. Otherwise, set t = t+ 1 and go to step 1.
5. Repeat these steps for each of the R simulation draws. The simulated path probability is
  = 1R
PR
r=1  
r.
This algorithm simplies the problem because drawing f rt and o
r
t conditional on the previous draw
is very straightforward, while drawing from the complete distribution would be very di¢ cult.
C3: Outcome Probabilities. The most straightforward outcome probability found in the like-
lihood function is the probability of observing a person attending school or being unemployed. The
likelihood contribution is simply the probability that the value of attending school exceeds the value
of any other choice in the persons choice set, Dnet . Conditional on the unobserved state variables
except ", the choice probability is of the multinomial logit form,
Pr(dit = s j
; oit; fit; Sit;i) = exp(Vt(s))P
k2Dnet
exp(Vt(k))
. (24)
The probabilities for outcomes involving employment are similar to the non-employed outcome prob-
abilities, except the choice probability is conditioned on the observed wage and multiplied by the wage
density.
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